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164 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REViEw [VOL. 34
RECENT CASES
ADOPTION - INHERITANCE BY ADOPTED CHILD - RIGHT OF AnoPrE Csm.n-
REN To TAKE UNDER CLASS GIFr FROM OTHER THAN ADoPnrvE PARENTS. -
Testatrix's will placed a certain fund in trust for a niece for life, remainder
to the child or children of the niece. Nineteen years after the death of the
testatrix, the niece adopted an adult woman and her two minor daughters.
The California Supreme Court held, that under statutory law' the adopted
children were included in the term "children" in the will, and took as mem-
bers of the class upon the death of their adoptive mother. In re Stanford's
Estate, 315 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1957).
The weight of authority in this country appears to be that an adopted
child inherits from but not through his adoptive parents.2 However, a few
jurisdictions have allowed the adopted child to inherit both from and through
them.3 The problem in the instant case is not one of inheritance by right of
statutory distribution and descent however, but whether the words "child or
children" as used in a will include adopted persons.
4
In determining the right of an adopted child to take under a will the iin-
tent of the testator is controlling. 5 Where the. testamentary intent is in-
definite or obscure, an adopted child may take if his status answers the
description of the will. The statutory system supplies the intention.8 In ascer-
taining whether a gift to "children" includes an adopted child, it will be pre-
sumed that the testator knew and acted in contemplation of the reciprocal
rights and duties arising from the existing statutes relating to adoption.
7
Therefore, if the adoption statute can be interpreted to include an adopted
child when one other than the adoptive parent uses the term "children" in a
will, the adopted child will take under the will, no intention to the contrary
being found. In In re Darling's Estate,8 the California Court held, that "the
1. Cal. Gen. Laws 'Arm. § 228 (1954) "A child, when adopted, may take the
family name of the person adopting. After adoption, the two shall sustain towards each
other the legal relation of parent and child, and have all the rights and be subiect to all
the duties of that relation."
2. See In re Estate of Pierce, 32 Cal.2d 265, 196 P.2d 1 (1948); Hockaday
v. Lynn. 200 Mo. 456, 98 S.W. 585 (1906); Grimes v. Grimes, 207 N.C. 778, 178 S.E.
573 (1935); Batcheller-Durkee v. Batcheller, 39 R.I. 45, 97 At. 378 (1916); In re
Harrington's Estate, 96 Utah 252, 85 P.2d 630 (1938); Mott v. National Bank of Com-
merce, 190 Va. 1006, 59 S.E.2d 97 (1950); In re Bradley's Estate, 185 Wis. 393, 201
N.W. 973 (1925). These courts reason, inter alia, that statutes in derogation of the
common law are to be strictly construed; the legislature should use explicit and unmis-
tabable language to confer such a right; a testator who is not the adoptive parent has no
obligation, moral or family, to provide for such children- statutes working a change !n
canons of descent are to be 'strictly construed; blood relationship has always been recog-
nized by the common law as a potent factor in testicy and should not be treated lightly;
and an adoptive parent has no moral right to impose upon another the status of a rela-
tive of an adopted child.
3. See McCune v. Oldham, 213 Iowa 1221, 240 N.W. 678 (1932); Denton v. Miller,
110 Kan. 292, 203 Pac. 693 (1922); Bedinger v. Graybell's Executor and Trustee, 302
S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957); In re Ballantine's Estate, 81 N.W.2d 259, 262 (N.D. 1957)
(dictum).
4. In re Stanford's Estate, 315 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1957); Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79,
23 S.E.2d 420 (1942); Wilder v. Wilder, 116 Me. 398, 102 Ad. 110 (1917).
5. E.g., Mooney v. Tolles, IlI Conn. 1, 149 At. 515 (1930); Comer v. Comer,
supra note 4; Wilder v. Wilder, supra note 4.
6. Dulfon v. Keasbey, 111 N.J. Eq. 223, 162 Al. (Ch. 1932).
7. Mooney v. Tolles, 111 Conn. 1, 149 Atl. 515 (1930).
8. 173 Cal. 221, 159 Pac. 606 (1916). In In re Kruse's Estate 260 P.2d 969, 120
Cal. App.2d 254 (1953) the court said:- "Since this decision [In re Darling's Estate] it
has been consistently held that an adopted chfld while he inherits from his adopting par-
ents does not inherit through them from the relatives of the adopting parents. In re Es-
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adoption statutes of this state do not purport to affect the relationship otlany
person other than that of the parent's by blood, the adopting parents, and the
child." Other courts with similar statutes have held accordingly.9 This would
seem to indicate that the adoption statutes in the instant case are not appli-
cable in determining the testatrix's intention.
In interpreting a will to find the intention of the testator the following
presumptions are found to be in general use by the courts. The presumption
that where the testator is the adoptive parent, an adopted child is included
in the term "children". 10 Where the testator is not the adoptive parent, the
presumption is that he did not intend such inclusion,"5 especially when the
adoption takes place after the testator's death.12 Only where the testator has
clearly shown by other words that he intended to use the word "children" in
a more extensive sense will this presumption be overcome.':.
The holding in the instant case would appear to give one taking a life
estate with remainder to his children what is in effect a general power of
appointment over the property. There seems to be nothing to prevent thc
holder of the life estate from adopting anyone whom he wishes to take the
property upon his death.1" Such a result does not seem to be in accord with
legislative intent as expressed in the adoption statutes, nor with the intent
of a testator in circumstances similar to those in the instant case.
RICHARD A. RAHLFS.
CIVI. PROCEDURE - DiscovmtY - LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE LIMITS
NOT DISCOVERABLE. - In an action arising out of a motorcycle-automobile
collision, plaintiff sought, by discovery proceedings, knowledge of the limits
of defendant's automobile liability policy. In reversing the lower court's order
requiring defendant to answer questions on this point, the Supreme Court of
Florida, one justice dissenting, held that limits of liability in insurance policies
are not matters subject to discovery under the Florida Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957).
tate of Pence, 117 Cal. App. 323, 332-333, 4 P.2d 202; In re Estate of Jones, 3 Cal.
App.2d 395, 39 P.2d 847; In re Estate of Stewart, 30 Cal. App.2d 594, 86 P.2d 1071;
In re Estate of Pierce, 32 CaL2d 265, 269, 196 P.2d 1; Probate Code, sec. 257." In In re
Stewart's Estate, supra at 1073 the California District Court of Appeal allowed an estate
to escheat to the state, rather than allow the adopted children of a predeceased cousin
of the intestate take. The court said that "had the legislature intended to enlarge the
right of succession of an adopted child to inherit through, and not trom the adopted
parent, it would have so provided."
9. See Batcheller-Durkee v. Batcheller, 39 R.I. 45, 97 At. 378 (1916) and case's
cited therein.
10. Brunton v. International Trust Co., 114 Colo. 298, 164 P.2d 472, 477 (1945)
(dictum); Appeal of Wildman, 111 Conn. 683, 151 AtI. 265, 266 (1930) (dictum);
Wilder v. Wilder, 116 Me. 389, 102 AtI. 110, 111 (1917) (dictum).
11. Brunton v. International Trust Co., supra note 10; Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaff-
ney, 46 Conn. 61, 112 Atl. 689 (1921); Pierce v. Farmers State Bank, 222 Ind. 116,
51 N.E.2d 480 (1943); Copeland v. State Bank and Trust Co., 300 Ky. 432, 188 S.W.2d
1017 (1945); Wilder v. Wilder, supra note 10; In re Fisler, 131 N.J.Eq. 310, 25 A.2d
265 (Prerog. Ct. 1942).
12. Appeal of Wildman, 111 Conn. 683, 151 Atl. 265 (1930); Copeland v. State
Bank and Trust Co., supra note 11.
. 13. Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. .79, 23 S.E.2d 420 (1942); Copeland v. State Bank
and Trust Co., upra note 11; In re Fisler's Estate, 131 N.J.Eq. 310, 25 A.2d 265
(Prerog Ct. 1942).
14. See Bedinger v. Graybill's Executor and Trustee, 302 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957)(where testatrix placed a fund in trust for her son for life, remainder to his heirs at law,
and upon failure of heirs, to specified charities. Eighteen years after testatrix died the son
adopted his wife. The court allowed the adopted wife to take under the will as a "child"
of the son.)
